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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
LEOXAR.D ~IEADS, 
Plaiw.,ti f f and Appellant, 
RICH.AJ~l) C~~ DIBBLEE, Adntinistrator 
of the eHtate of ~JOHN RICH~~J~J) S.ltL~ 
l\·1 ON, Decea8ed, and ),:IEl-tlll I,.J.J I~. COL-
TON, 
De.f e1~ da·nts and Respondents. 
BRIEr"' OF R-ESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case No. 
9080 
Tills la,,~suit \,-a:-: brought by the father of Ellen 
1feads, a n1inor 17 years of age, to recover damages on 
account of her alleged \vrongful death arising out of an 
accident that or..eurred otJ the 10th day of J·1me, 1958, at 
a ho u t 1 0 :45 T_l ~ .\ 1. on 1~.. 8. 1 lighv.'ay 91 in Ameriean Fork, 
LTtall, (R .. l) .. ~lien ~1 <.\nd~ and the deceased, .John R-ich-
ard Salluon~ had gone together for over a year and at the 
tinlP of the arch-lent ,\·rre engaged to be tnarried, (Leon-
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ard ~fead's deposition p. 5 and 6). 
Sal ruon and 1\feads had left the 2tleads' home in Salt 
Lake about 8 :00 P .. ~f.. They \Vent for a ride and had pro-
ceeded south along U.S. H igln\~ay 91 to .. -\ 1nerican Fork, 
l:tah, (R. 11, 12). 
_i\_ccording to t l1e eorn plaint, Salrnon 1Y as driving east 
along LT. S. lligh,vay 91, pulled oii the h igh\vay~ and 
atten1pted to 1nake a left turn .in front of an e~~tbound 
t1uck and trailer outfit driven by the defendant, Colton. 
Tlte t \VO vehicles collided~ Salmon died alinost inrrnedi-
ately, but lie ads ~ived for a \veek. Sal1non 's death, thcre-
fol·e, preceded the death of ]jllcn \leads by approximately 
one \\·eek, (Leonard ~·1 eads' deposjtjon1 p. 14, 15, iS). Thi8 
\ v a~ adu1i t ted by )I earls~ r..onn sel at the pre-trial, ( ~;\ p pe 1-
lant~~ brief, page 3). 
Plaintiff, the father of :\] ead~, filed 1he suit against 
Nahnon~s estate .and a1so against Colton. It \Vas e-1airned 
that Colton "\Vas negligent and that Sahnon \\-as guilty 
of 'vilfnl nli.sconduct. As far as the defendant Salmon 
\\ras eoncerned 1 the action "\Vas one under Ole guest statute, 
(11.~). 
During the ,\~eek that l\T ead~ Jived she repeat-edly 
tried to jinpret:s upon her parents that the accident was 
not Salrnon'H fault~ (L~onard )_feads' deposition p .. 7) . 
... :\t the prc~trial hear-jng the defendant, Salmon, 
rnoved to djs1ni~s the case a~ against the estate on the 
ground that since Nahnon "\Ya~ instantly killed in the 
accident and 1\Iead::; lived for a "\\7eek thereafter, that the 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
3 
nction did not rotne into existence until a week follov•ing 
Hahnon 's death and, t.llert .. fore~ e.ould not be maintained 
as against Salrnon~s estate. A judgment "\Ya~ entered dis~ 
tnissing the case as against the estate, but continuing 
the action as against the defendant, Colton, (R. 22, 23). 
1 t i~ fron1 this judgn1ent that the plaintiff has taken thiR 
in t t \ r1nedia te appeal. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED THE AC-
TION AS AGAINST THE ESTATE. 
ARGl"l-tiENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED THE AC-
TION AS AGAINST THE ESTATE. 
At eounuon la\Y no one eould Inaintain a ·w-rongfu1 
death action nor {!Ould sueh an action be brought against 
the e:state of the \\.Trongdoer. By ~ta.tute in this state the 
t· () 111 rn on la" ~ r nl e "\Vas changed to pe rrni t "\\7 ro ngf ul death 
action~ to be filed by a personal representative or by thP 
h ei r.s of the . deceased a.gains t a living person. Tl1e coln-
Jnon Ia~,,~ rule still ren1ained in effect in lJtah precluding 
actions for injuries or death against the estatP of thP. 
\rrongdoer. 
In 1953 tl1e l!tah L-egislature enacted Se('tion 78~11~ 
12 'vhich provides a8 follows: 
"~(1ause~ of action arising out of ph~..-sical in-
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jury to the perHon or death, cauE"-;ed by the vrrong-
fnl aet or negligenee of another, shall not abate 
upon the death of the Vlrongdocr. *~*.'' (Italics 
ours) 
rrhc 1~tah Suprerne [~ourt -ronsidcrcd this statute 
in the Ca3e of J ..,rflz r. AndP.-rso-n, 51Jtah (~d) 290~ 300 Pac .. 
(2d) n42r ln that case one .l\..nderson "\vhile driving south 
on T_T.. S. IIigh\vay 91 overturned hls ear near llolden, 
I~tah. The car blocked the northbound lane of traffic .. 
rrhe plaintiff "\V}ril e proceeding nort}l a} ong the hig}nvay 
at night failed to !-5ee the .A ndcrson vcl1ie-le blocking lttLr 
lane~ and erat:Jhcd -into it. ·wollo\ving that aeeident., .L\..nd-er-
son "\vas dead. No cvldenr-e \Vas l}Tef.;ented as to vrhether 
.A uderson had died prior to the second ac-eident. Tl ~i ~ 
Coul't jn that eaE"-;e stated as follo1\'S: 
~ ~ The s u rv i v a 1 ~ t.a t u i c, l ~. ( ~. ...:\... 195 3, 7 8-11- J. ~ 1 
provides that the cause of action shall not abate 
upon the death of the v.rrongdoer; !], li.~·, l he ca·use 
of act-ion cannot a-rise at a lt~n~ e he yond the h'_h· 
of f 1u: tort / e a~ or/' ( 1 tal i (' ~ ours ) 
The reasoning of this (~ourt 1vas that the language 
·•shall not abatcn required t ha1 a can,:.;.p of action had to 
be in ex i ~:dene(~ prior to the death of the \vrongdoer . .t\.r~ 
(•onii ngly, this Court reversed the judg1nent in favor of 
the plaintiff and sent the case back for a nevr trial to 
determine "\vhethcr AndcrHon 1vas alive or dead at the 
time of the second accident .. 
In the Fretz c·.n~t~ t 1 ~ i ~ court ha~ construed Section 
78-11·1.~ and said that if the .action is not to be abated:o 
it must have been in existence befor(_\ tltc death of the 
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tort f(·a~or, or putting the 1natter another \va:v~ the cause 
()f action (·annot arise after the death of the tort feasor4 
rrhh.; being 1 he case, the only question jnvolved on thi~ 
a.p pPal is \\" ~ u_~tlle r there \\r~Ls a \Vrongfu I death action in 
~xistence at the titne of Sahnon's death~ If not, Stetion 
7.~.11-1:::! does not eovcr the situation .. The 1natter is stiJl 
goY{_"' rncd by the conm10 n l a \V. The plaintiff v,~ ould have 
no eau~e of action again~t the estate. It \V.H.~ and iR the 
respondent'~ position in this ca~e that since tlu: plaintiff'~ 
intestate did not die until a \\·cck an Pr Salrnon, any cau~c 
of action "\Yhich the l)laintiff had for Vt~rongful death did 
not and could not ari~e until the death of the plaintiff's 
in testate. It "-a::J, therefore, not in (.~x [stence prior to Sal-
Inon'~ death whielt j~ the requirernent in the Fretz ta~e. 
'l~here "\Va....~ nothing on \\'hicll our ~ur·vival statute c.ould, 
therefore, apply. 
Counsel f"o r app(~llant in hi~ brjcf 1·efer~ to certain 
constitutional J}rovisions of tl1e l~ta.h State C~onstitution 
to the effect that a rig-ht of action to recover dan1age8 
for VilTongful death shall not he abrogated .. ~Phi~ 1~ \Vholly 
jnapplicahle. I)rior to the }!assage of Section 78-ll-12 
there 'Ya~ no right of action lo recover for personal injur~ 
ir.:-; or \VrongfLil death agaiTl~t the estate of tlte ,,,.rongdoer. 
ll~or that tnatter, prior to 1 h.e enactment of Section 78-1 1.-G~ 
or it~ earlier r.ounterpart ~ the plaintiff \\-7 ould not have had 
a ta n~-e of net ion for \\·rnngful deatl1 even as against a 
li,·ing \Vrongdoer. 
~..\nY tn rtiou~ cau~c· of a(_~tion reflnircs at lea~ I t\\-0 
~,lrn1ents, nan1ely, a n~'Fl igent aet, and dantage. Before 
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a \\~rongful death action can he maintained, the death of 
;-3ome person rnust have occurred. The action is sirnply 
not in exister1r<..~ .and can not be filed until the death. 
Bouv. La\v Dictionary defines a ran~e of action a.'3-
rollo-9{S: 
~.: . .:\. eaut;e of action is said to accrue to any 
l)erson u.7he·n that }Je r80n f"irst co Ul f' 6 to a. right 
to hr:iHfJ on a-ction~·"' (Italic~ ours .. ) 
(}bviousl)r!t the }llaintiff jn thi::: aet.ion d.id not have a rigl1t 
to bring an action until his daughter's death ... :\.t. t.hat tin1c 
it is equally true that Salmon 1vas dead. The plaint iff 
under our ~nrvival statute~ particularly as interpreted by 
thj8 Court in tl1e Fretz ra~e, <.jannot reeover a~ again~t 
Salrnon. 
See al~o I)ost u. CuniJ){lH, 3 ~. \V-. :27~ nt. page :27:\, 
\vherein tlle (:ourt held~ 
~~The t .. lentents of a r.aH~e of action are---Fir~t!t 
a bren.e h of duty o"\\"i.ng by one person to another; 
and, second, a damage re~ ulting to t l1 e other fron1 
the breach .. " 
SPe alfio llegt_~l L', George. (\Vi::;.)~ lj!) X."'\\'". 8()~, at 
page S63, v.-~herein the court, in holding that a cause of 
a.e t ion for \Vrongful death doe~ not ari ~l\ u n t 11 the victin1 ~ ~ 
death, stated: 
t.~ It 1 ~ 1 rue, of tour~e, that in part the eau~e 
of aetion springs frotn or aris(ls ont of negligenec 
or 1\'illful \Vrong. Certainly, it is dependent upon 
the doing of a tortious art.. It t.s equa.lly t ru.e that 
~~t has no c.ristence u nl c~"!.s a ud 1, u f if de a t.h ocrurs, 
any n1orl"· than a (·fnr::;c of acft~ou _f()t nr.qligence 
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comes in.fl) be1~tt{; i--n ad·l~ance of injury pro:ri1natcly 
ca u srd by the act. No one can sue upon it, 
not because of any personal disability, but because 
there is no cause of action.'' (Italies ours) 
Appcllanf~ coun~el at page 9 of his brief eonredcf.' 
that the ,,,.Tongful death action "is not complete until tl1 e 
injured person has died," and says that "technically 
~11eaking'' the death aetion does not ariRe until the death 
or the injured person. This (~ourt in the case of Va1l 
Wagone-r r .. l/nion Pacific Ilailroa-d Co., 112 Ctah 189, 
18G Pac .. (2d) 293,. in speaking of the 'vrongful death ac-
tion stated that the san1e "~is f o1mded on the same unla \V-
ful acts of the defendant, but the Joss and damages suf-
fered by theu1 arise out of the death of the deceased .. rl,he 
t_.egislature ha~ thus said the rigl1t of action vests in the 
heir·~ at Ia,,- il death en~ue._"~' ~ ~ llfl it ba8es t~eco'Very on the 
'vrongful death by another~', (Italics ours) This being 
the caHC<, \\Te 1 u: l ieve the conclusion i!:: inescapable th.a t 
there \,-as rto \\·rongful death action a.~ against Salmon 
in exist\.\nee prior to his U\Vn death~ Since this Court al-
ready has J1eJd in tht\ Fretr. case that ''"the cause of ar.tion 
cannot arisl\ at a titne beyond the life of the tort feasor,~' 
the eonclu~ion i~ likev,'ise inesca1)able that the ar.tion 
{~ann ot be n1ain tained against tJ1e estate~ 
Counsel for appPllant complain~ that the j11dg1nent 
entered in t.hi ~ (•nf.;e emasculates the statute and brings 
about a har~h and unjust result. The an:n~~er to this argu~ 
tnent has been \veil ~tated by thi~ Honorable Court in the 
rn ~t~ of Bron~ n v.. lV. i.rt ht n~ a·n, 47 lTtah 31,. 151 Pac. 366, 
\Vllerein it '\\,..as said; 
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~'While the common-la1v rule i.':l a harsh one, 
and its enforeernent in this ease is peeuliarly un-
just, 1\'e nevertheless ean see no "\Yay of esr.aping 
it. T'hc r·igl1t and po"'\\'~er, as "'ell as the duty, of 
creating rights and to pro vi de reined ies, 1 i es v.rith 
the Tjegislature, and not with the courts. Courts 
can only ·prote-ct and enforce existing rights, and 
tl1ey may do that only in accordaru_~e '\vith estab-
Jj sl1cd and knn\vn remedies.'' 
See also Cla1.t.ssen. "i;~ Brothers, (S.:C.), l·t) S.E4 5:~~:t 
'"herein it is sajd: 
h\Vhile the act .i~ l"Cinedial, and a liberal con-
:_.jtruction should he given to its provisions ( I\f orri 8 
v. Spart.anburg Gas & E. Co., 70 S.C. 281~ 49 S.E . 
.S!15), 've 1nust re~ort, in arriving at the intent of 
the Legislature, to U1e actual \Vord~ used in the 
Statute, .and the court should not place such judi-
( ... tal eor1~truction upon the language used as to ef-
fectua tc 1 ts O"\\o11 r·.oncep tion of right rather than 
the in tent of the Legislatur P. J' 
See also JI arlinelli r. Burke, (Jia~s.) 10 X4E. (:2rl) 
113, \vherein the l\Ia~sat~llu6ett~ eourt quotes \vtth ap-
proval f rorn one of its prcv i ou s deci ~ions a~ follo,vs : 
'' _.:\_ statute cannot he extended hy construction 
or enlargement beyond its fair import If it docs 
not reasoiJabJ.v include a right of action, none can 
he implied. The argument of hardship or uninten-
tional omission is not enough." 
l11 cousideri11g legal authorities citP.d in our o,,-n 
brief n.~ \vell n;:.; those cited b~- the appellant's counsel it 
is irn po rtan t to In ake e r~ rta in distinctions. 
1. ACTIONS FOR PERSONAL INJURIES MUST BE 
DISTI).J'Gl:ISHED FROJ\.f THOSE FOR WRONGFUL DEATH. 
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.A..lt.hough 1 he autho1'it ies are in eonflict, those case~ 
\vhich hold that the plaintiff ntay sue for personal injuries 
agn i nst the e~ta te of the dece-ased ,,. rongdoer do so either 
under their o\vn peculiar ~tatute, or becau:;e 1 t if; imposs-
ible to ~a~~ that a person died before the injury "~as in-
flicted. 
The follo\ving cases cited b~y appellant involve per~ 
sonal injur~- only: Cash r. Addington., (N.~I.) 131. :Par. 
(~d) .:.!()~); l'ord r. J1laue:!/S Estntr (Mich.) 232 K .. ,,; .. 393; 
Booth 1..'. F-ranke-nstei-n, ('\Tis.) 2.t) N. vv·. 191; Jfrrrill r. 
Be()ncith c~~lth) 61 Fed. (2d) 91:!; 11/aloney T. r~-icl-or, ~i~) 
X YS ( 2d) ~57. 
r.rlH.\ l"ea~on ing in Cash rL Addington, (N ~~-1.) ~ 131 Pac .. 
(~d) :?GG ~ is as follo-ws: 
~·~~~ Addington's injur~r necessarily preceded 
hi:-; deatl1~ and li l'e rould not poRsihly have beco1n.P 
extinet before (~.ash and hi~ .automobile 'vere in 
jured .. *** '" 
In i·'ord r . .Jiane,1/ .... ' J~}8tate, (:Jfir.h.) 232 N~\Y. a9:3,. the 
.\[ ichigan court ll~Pd thP- same rPaf.ioning and then added 
thi . ....: statement: 
'~ \ V hethc r an aet ion '\' ould su l'Vi ve 'vhere t l1._, 
tort feasor ~~ in fact killed at the instant of inju r~­
to a plaintiff n1ay be left to a proper ra~e and thr 
a~sistaneP of briefs upon the ~pecific po·jnt. ,, 
'fh.is r-lear 1 y i nd ~<"·a tr s that the opinion of the 1\Iichigan 
( \nu't does not eover the present situation. 
In Booth t\ Ft·aJtkc-u.s t e t n, (\V-is.) 245 X.' V. 191 ~ th r· 
eourt ~n that. case said: 
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''However, \\"C do not find it neees~ary to de-
cide, und 1ve do not dec-ide whether the princjple 
f•.ontend-ed for is valid/~ (Italics ours) 
Tlte principle eon tended for in t t1 at eat:;e 'vas that t.hc 
pl~ r~onal injury ac.i.i on did not a l'i ~e until tJ1e injury \vas 
complete. 
In Jf crrill c. llft~ku·ith, CFifth Circuit) 61 Fed. (2d) 
912, the (1 ou r't said; 
·~ ~Ierrill ,s lllJl111~ neeessarily preeeded hi t5 
deatl1 and life r.ould not possibly have beeon1e 
ext i Tl tt bcf ore Billy Beek'vi th v.,.-a.s injured.', 
In JJ alo·ney r. J ~ h:tor, 2:) X~ ··r.s. { 2d) 257, the sante 
reasoning V{as applied. ~rhc appeHant in co1nmcnting 
upon thi~ caRe ~tates that it rejP.r.ted the Massachusett~ 
case of 1vf arti·nclli c. Bnrkc. In this conneetion the New 
York ·Court in referring to the case of Jl a'rfinelli· u .. Burke 
said: 
~ .. It is at lea~t questiona1Jle ,,-11et l1 e r the de-
.~i :;ion i~ ~trieU,v in point In vie\v or the tenus of 
the ~tatute i nvo 1 ved~ ~ ~ * :t' 
indi(~ating that there \\'fl~ a difference in the statute~ in 
the t.\vo ~ t a t.es. 
F~rotn the foregojng it is allparent that r_ases involv-
ing personal injnr~~ are clearly di stingu.ished from tho::;e 
involving 1\,'Tongful death ..... lll of them go upon the theol"Y 
that plaintiff's injur)- necessarily preeeded defendant·~ 
death~ however in~t.antaneous~ Both elen1ents of the 
c·.ause c)~· action, to~1vit: negligen(~e and injury, \Vere jn 
existPnce prior to the death. That arg~unent cannot pos-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
11 
::-;illly he Inade in deatl~ cases. In the injury case both 
the V..""rong and the drunage are in existence prior to the 
death. In this action, the deatb, \vhich this Court has 
~tated is the basis for the action, did not occur until a 
\reek after ~almon died. Personal injury cases are, there~ 
fore, simply not in point on the question presented by this 
appeal. 
2. IN WRONGFUL DEATH CASES STATUTES IN~ 
VOLVED MUST BE CAREFULLY ANALYZED. 
ln considering tl1e cases on the subject involving 
\\~rongful death actions against the estate of the tort 
feasor, it is of the utmost itnportance to distinguish 
between the statutes in force in those states and the 
statute as it exists in the State of C tah4 The decisions 
in the various c.ourts readily reflect that they have been 
based entirely upon the particular statute involved. 
The statutes in general upon \vhiclt tlte cases have 
been based r.an be put into t."w·o separate groups l-\'hich are 
hereinafter separately ~tated and eonsidered .. 
(a) STATUTES, LIKE UTAHt IN \VHICH IT IS SAlD 
THE A·CTION "'~SHALL NOT ABATE.'t 
''T e kno\\: o£ only t'ro cases in v,~h ieh the statute~ 
ron~t ~~ucd had the \Yord~ ~·shal1 not abate." In each of 
the~e cases the courts l1eld that the 'vrongful death action 
did not lie against tl~e e~tate of the tort feasor .. 
The first of the~e rases is .1.lf cLellan v. Au.toJn obile 
lu3. Co. of llart{ord, ()onu. (Kinth Circuit) SO ~\~d. (2d) 
3-!-:!. Thi:-:; v.ras an action by· a special admjn istrator 
agail1~t an insnranee company. The sole issue prescnt~?ri 
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Oll the appeal \Vas \Vhether under the Ht.atnteH of ~;\rizona 
there "\vas a survival of the right of action in favor of the 
appellant admin i~ t rn tor to recover against the adminis-
trator of the estate of the dec.eased \Ytongdoer .. This \vat:; 
the sole bat:1i~ of the de1nurrer and of the deej~jon of th~ 
lov{er court.. A ri.zona statute provided that. an action 
"may 11ot abate" by the death or disability of a party. 
The specific qnrst ion, as jndicated by the Federal Court, 
\VaS: 
''1\l e rn us t therefore p_xamin e the statutes of 
-1\ rizona, and detennine "'hether or not they spe-
cifically authorize an action for .:u.eath by "\vrong-
ful act' after the death of the al1eged '\:rrongdoer. '' 
'The l~ourt tl•cn held that under the Arizona statute th~ 
cause of action did not survive against the t·~tatc of the 
\VTongdoer~ 
See also In thls same class the case o.f Yount v .. 
f.tral/oual Bank nf Ja-ckson, b'xeoutor1 ( ~lieh.)~ ±2 ).I_ \r~ 
(2d) 110 .. There an automobile accident had occurred in 
.... -\lahaina resulting in the death of certain ~Iichigan res 1-
dents.. The driver died first and one of the pas~engers 
a fe1v hour~ later.. ~A..ilininiHtration on both e~tateH \\-a~ in 
Michigan. rrhe pas~enger~~ adtninistrntor brought the 
iru:;tant actjon again~t 1 he driver\::. pxee.utor in 1\Iiehlgan 
under the wrongful death ~tat.ute of .. A..laba1na. The ~tat­
u te, afj 0. r authorizing actionf; for \\~rongful death, pro-
vided that ~~such action shall not abate by the death of the 
defendant but 1nay be reviVt1d against his personal repre-
sentative.H (Italie::::. ours) 
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tion survived the death of the driver. This, the court held, 
waH governed by the la"\\T of Alabama.. The court then 
l1eld~ considering the terms of the statute and the con-
:-:tru<:t.lon placed upon it by the Alabama Courts, that 
there \Vrt.~ no change in the common-law rule, and the 
r·ause of action did not survive. 
The )licltigan eourt after revie,ving the .Alaba1na 
Statute and decisions~ s.ajd: 
~'The statute relied upon by plaintiff doe~ 
not change the eo1mnon la";r rule that ex del ir.to 
causes of action do not su rvivc the death of the 
tortfeasor ''rhere the tortfeasor~s death precede~ 
tlta t of his viet I ul." 
Thus, in the only cases where the statute used the 
lan!ruage Hshall not abate" the deei sinns arc in lLar·•nony 
and to the effect that the action doc6 not lie against the 
estate of the ,,~rongdoer4 
(b) STATCTES \VHICH PROVIDE I~ SUBSTAN.CE 
TliAT THE PERSO~ WHO 'YlOULD HAVE BEEN LIABLE IF 
DEATH HAD NOT ENSl:Eo SHALL BE LIABLE, AND 
WHEN THE ACTIO:-.:J' IS AGAINST AN AD11INISTRATOR 
OR EST~~TE, THE DA~lAGES RECOVERED SIIALL BE A 
VALID CLAI:\f AGAINST THE EST ATE OF SCCH DE-
CEASED PERSON~ 
('a~e~ ]n this c-lassification \Vith statutes different 
than our~ are based upon their rn\·n peculiar pruvi.sionR 
and n n"' ('len r· 1 y not in point for tb at rea8on.. The general 
type of ~tatute for this eJa::.sifi<'!ation of rasr8 pcnnit~ the 
iH' t ion to he hrought again~ t the ~~tate of the 'vTongdoer 
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if the action might have been maintained by the decedent 
in hi~ lifetime. That is sotnething 'vholly different fro1n 
our ov,~n statute~ Clear})~~ the decedent eould have main-
tained an action for injury in llil:l lifetinu:, and that being 
the case, under those statutes an action could be lnain-
tained against the estate of the \Vrongdoer. I~ o \VCV~ r, 
even under statutes having this particular \Vording, the 
authorities are in irreconcilable conflict. In this category 
the foil O\v i ng <.~a~e~ l1a ve held the a~tion cannot be main~ 
tained: l1t-re OllteJ/8 F:.·3late (t\lieh+) 1-! N.W~ (2d) 57-±; 
jlJ artinelli v~ BHrkr ( ~-1 ass~) 10 NJ~~~ (~d) 113; S·il ra 1.\ 
Keega-n (:l:lass.) 2;.~ ~"'.ll~- (2d) 867; Cla-us.~ en r. Brothe·rs, 
{~.C.) 1-lf> S.E. 539 ; B eavcr's .. :id rn·~.r ~ · ~ Putnam's Curu.to r 
(\Ta .. ) G7 S.E .. 353, and Hegel v .. GeorgeJ (Wis.) 259 N.W~ 
862. Cases adopting the contrary· vie'v are Kerr v. Bash-
nnr.~ 233 ~ .... "\\T~ 853~ 353 N.\~~l. 490~ ~64 :\~\V .. 187; Fish r. 
J ... ar:IJ, (Colo.) 208 Pac. (~d) 930; f}hrliclt v. Jl er-rNt~ 96 
~., e (). ( ~ d ) 2 51 , ( 3 rd t~ i r ~ ) t and K u h n l e e t nl r r r ~9 w edl u nr! . 
( I\finn.) 20 N L "\\1• {:.!d) ;~96. 
In this rntegory 've 'vill first consider the eases cited 
l1y and relied upon by counsel for appellant and ~ltO\\- that 
they are based upon their o'vn peeulial· statute and there-
fore clearly distinguishalJle fron1 our (H\Tn (·a~~~ 
In ](err v. Ba.~1uun., 23~ )J,,,T. Sj3, 2!J3 x_,,~. -!90, 26-:1: 
:\.\V. 18"7, the .~tatute provided: 
'~~ ~ ~ The corporation ""'hi(·h, or the person 
\,-ho, \\"01110. l1avc been liable, if death had not en-
sued~ or the adntlnistrat o1· or executor of the t~­
tate of ~ue h per~ on as sur.h adtn in i ~ trator or e xr·-
cutor, shall be llallle to a.n action ford:~ 111age~~ not-
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\vi.thst anding the death of the person injured; ""** 
and 'vhen the action i~ .against sueh administra-tor 
or executor, the darnages recovered shall be a 
valirl. clailn against the estate of ~nch deceased 
person." 
The 8outlt Dakota eourt in that ca~e held: 
'~ \V'" e think this an1ount s to InorP. than a IIlerc 
proviHion for the survival of a cause of action 
\vhich existed against the wrongdoer in Iris life-
timer ~** \\Then Bennett died frorn the in,jttry, the 
liabili(y previously contingent beeatne ahsolu1 e1 
and the cause of action accrued, o·n.rl under this 
parr-1:cula.r sta·tute \VC believe it. arrTned again~t 
Hashatn~ if ]lving ("·w·ith survival against hif.; estate 
if he subsequently rlied), or against Basham~s es-
tate., as such, if he had predeceased Bennett In 
vie·w of the la·nguage of our statute, VtTe do not 
believe it V{as in tended that the existence of the 
cau~e of action for \vrongful death should depend 
upon 1vh ethc r or not the \vrongdoe r survived l ~i~ 
victhn." (Italics ours.) 
In F·ish r. L-iley, ( (~olo.) :!OK T:'ar.. ( 2d) 930, the Co I o-
rado i'tatntPs \Vere HH follo\vS: 
Section 2~ C~hapter 50, 19~i5 (~ .. S. ~\.: 
~~ 'Vhenever the death of a person ~ ha11 be 
caused hy a "\Vrongful act, neglect or default of an-
other, and the act~ neg-lect, or default is such as 
"\vould (if deatl1 had not ensued) havt~ entitled the 
party injured to maintain an action and rceover 
uantages in respect tl1ereof~ thGn, and in every sur.h 
rase~ the per~on \Yh0 1 or the cor·poration which 
\vould have been J iahle~ if death had not en~ued, 
:..; hall he lia blc to an action for drunages notv{ith-
~tanding tl1e death of tlle part~y- injured.~, 
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Section 2+7, Chapter l7G, 1935 C. S~ A .. ; 
'~All actions in la-\~.r ,\~hatsoever, save and ex~ 
ccpt aetions on the case for slander or libel, or 
trespass for injuries done to the person, and at-
tions brought fol' the recovery of real estate~ shall 
survive to and against executors, adn1jni~trators 
and conservators.~' 
Tlte Colorado Court held that the dcc.ided cases from 
other jurisdictions sho,ved h\To lines of authorities upon 
\vhieh statutes giving survivors an action for Vlrongful 
death '\Vere La~ed, narnely, the survival theory and the 
ne\\' cause of aetion theory .. The Colorado Court followed 
the ne\\·~ e.ause olj action theor~'" and said the statute ,,ras 
not a survjval statute. rr11e Colorado Court ~aid: 
''As hereinabove pointed out, the Death ..:\.rt 
i~ not in its essenee a 'survival' statute, but oper~ 
atcs to eteate a nc'Y cause of aetion. The Jnaterin.t 
to n.d it. ·i.o n prer:edr n I [() th.P rrf({ t-io n of the ne1r 
cans:c of action rn the plaintiff, a.~ set forth i-n the 
stat-ule, i,o..,' that the v.·rongfal act of Drennan ·nn(:··d 
u e ~H('h us u_,·n:u ld J,o re r:·n tit.! erl f? tsh to n~ni·nt o in 
an ucl-~~on rrtul recot.~er da~nnqr8 ·in respect thereof~ 
\ v·e construe tile provision to be descriptive of 
tl1e kind of conduct on the part of the tort-fea~or 
'\'hich gives r.ise to the 1iabi1ity ercaterl hy thP 
statute. Tlterefore if at any ti1ne subsequent to 
the \\~rongful fi.(lt. of Drennan, and by reason of tl1P 
nature of said '\Vrougfnl ntt, Fish \YU8 entitled to 
rnaintnln an action and as of that Inoment to re~ 
cover damages~ the statutory· action nr.r.ruing to 
the plaintiff is perfPr·t0d upon tlu? death of Fis.h. 
The llc·nth Statute conte1nplatr~8 'entitle1nent' to 
an action at nny t.l1ne1 aud 'cntitleine11t' to da1nage~ 
at any tinH' follo\ring the "'rong"ful act of the tort-
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fca~or, and does not eontemplat{_~ a destrur.ti.on 
of the en use of artion created, by the death of the 
tort-feasor subsequent to the 'v rongful act rrsult-
ing in injurie~, and ultimately death, to another.:-;p 
(ltalie~ ourR) 
..:\ further co1nment of the Colorado (~ourt in this case is 
of particular interest: 
~'T~he decided ca~e~ from othf..~r jurisdictions 
bearing upon the question under discussion arl~ in 
irr<.:'(!(JH (~ j I able COD fl lCt. \v,..hetlter the vie'\T~ here-
inabOVe E"-Xpres~ed follo1v the rnajo1·it.y or minOl'"l ty 
of the dPcideu ea~es iR debatable ?.flU.Al ~·ar·iat..ions 
; n t h P stat-utory pro·1 ~L" io-n .s are considered~ * "* * '' 
(Italics ours) 
in Ehrl-ith v. ;_lferrilt, 96 Fed. (2-d) ~51, (Third Cir-
-._·ui t L t,\-o X C\V J"erse~y statutes 'vere involved. The first 
wa~ the so-call{_-.d Death Act, and the other 'vas the Exe-
eutorR Act. The ti1·~t authorized an arlminir.:trator i o re-
eovrr dan1age~ on beha1 f of the heirs for lNrongful death, 
Ltnd the second gave the exeeutor or ad.1ninistrator a right 
ot aet ion for COll~(!LOUS suffering, tncdical and l1o~pital 
ex pen~(~s~ "\\7hlch the injured party could havP ree.overed 
had he lived. Section 5 of the ExceutorH Act provided tl1nt 
the e~tate of a decea~ed \Vrongdoer should he liable for 
·~any trespa~~ to the person coininittcd by him or her dur-
ing his or ltCt"' lifetinic," and the deei~ion of the Third 
Circuit Court in that eaf'e 'vas based 11pon the "\Vordin~ 
of the )...T e\v J ersPy ~ta~ ute and particularly that portion 
pro\T iding that an e~tat e of a "\Vrongdoer should be 1 iable 
for any trespa~~ to the person comrnitted b,:-- h lm or her 
during his or hf~r lifetime, saying tl1at the ~tat nte made no 
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distinction in cases in 'vhich the tort feasor predeceased 
the injured party and those in which he did not. It also 
said that the cause of action created by the Death Act 
v,~as based upon the Vt'Ton gful act,. neg 1 ect or defa u1t of 
another and 'vas, therefore, founded upon the trespass 
to the person and therPfore survived. The court in that 
case said: 
''*** It is therefore obvious that the defend-
ant, being the personal representative of Ehrlicll~ 
w 1 ~ o~ in his lifetime, by his wrongful act, neglect 
or default., comtnitted a trespass to the person of 
~{erritt is liable in her representative P.apacity, in 
an action brought by the personal representative 
of 11 erl'itt~ for dantages c.au~ed by Ehrlich'l5 t.reg-
pass.'' 
The statutes involved in that tat5e bear no similarity 
whatsoever to the l:tah statute and the deeision 'was based 
upon the \vording of the Rtatutes in that case. 
The appellant rites certain~~ ichigan eaRP~. The situ. 
at ion in 1\fichiga n is ext rem ely interesting and sho'\\'S the 
irnportance of carefully distinguishing bet\veen the differ·-
cnt t~-p(.\~ of statutP~ involved~ The case of Ford v .. J!an-
ey':3 F: .... ·fal~, ( i\fi(lh.) :!3~ \=,,,7" .. 393, a~ \\~e 1tave l1eretofol'e 
indieatPd~ involved a personal injury action~ aud "-a~ rli~­
eusserl herein ~npra~ page 9~ 
J ~ u::; t-i u r. K e! c l1 a nJ, (::\I i ch. ) 298 N. ~ \ T. 294 \\~as the 
ncx t :\'l i Pl 1jga11 eaHe. That involved a situation where the 
defendant~R decedent ,\-a~ killed ahnost instantly and the 
plaintiff's decedent died 1.5 11ours aft~?r th(l ar.(·ident. 
The ~~tatute.~ referred to in that l\Iichigan r.n~(l~ a~ indi-
cated by the foot nott'~~. are a~ follo\V~: Co1npiJ.rd La"~s 
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1~ ~:!~), ~e(' t ion.~ l.tOGl and 1.-1-062~ and Coni pi led La,,~s 1929, 
St)(•tion 14040. NPr.t ion 14061 is kno"7J1 a8 the l)eath Act 
ar1d RPction 1 thereof reads as follo"is: 
u\Vhenever the death of a person ::ihall be 
eau~~..~rl hy 'vrongful act, neglect or default, and 
the :.v·1, neg I ect or de fa u1 t 1 s such as \vou1d (if 
death had not en~ued) have entitled tl1e patty 1n-
jurerl io 1naintain an aetion for the rc~covery of 
and reeover dan1ages, in respect t hPreof, then and 
in every ~uch r.a:;e, the perRon v.,.~ho, or the rorpora-
tion "~hich 1vould have beP.n liable, if death had not 
ensued, shall be liable to an action for damages, 
not-w·ithstanding the death of the per~on injured, 
and although the death sha.ll have been caused 
under ~ueh (!ireunlstanees as atnormt in law to 
felonv" 
... . 
~eetion J +U-t.U is kno\vn as the ~urvival .... :\.et and RO far 
:1.' p~.l rt i nent to t h c que~tion j nvolved in this <jnse, reads 
a.' (ollo"\vs: 
"'In addition to the action~ \\-hich ~urvive by 
the c,jonunon la.1\' the follo,ving shaH also ~u rvive, 
that i ~ to say, actions of replevin~ act ions for the 
eonv<._ .. r~ion of propert}\ for deceit, for assault and 
batt l~~·~-., for false intpri8oninent, for negligent in-
.iuries to per~on~~ :il~~" 
The only q Llt~sti on i nvol verl in that <:a:-:.p 1vas nnder 
the N.urv.iva 1 _.\ l~t and pnrt ieu1arly Vt~hether a cause of 
~H·t inn a(·e •ued upon \V hI rli the Sn rvival Act could app I.Y ~ 
rrhe ~tatnte j:-; not ~i llljlar at all to the lJtah statute. 
ln a latter (~a~e l n-t'f_, ( Jl u c ]/.:.,' ~'sf al c ~ ( liieh.) 1-t- X~ ,v-.. 
(:.?d) .)7 -t-~ Olney ''"as the driver of a (•flt ·w-hich eollided 
'vith anothPr vehiel(_ .. operated h:~' one Rennett and in 
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'vhich Bennett's v.--i.fe and daughter -~rere occupants .. Olney 
died 'vithin 24 hour~ after the collision. I\lrs. Bennett 
died six days after the accident. ]{en nett filed a claim 
in the Olney Estate for his personal injuries and property 
drunage and also as administrator for the death of his 
wife4 1~he IJrobate court allovled both the Bennetts t 
claiu1s, fron1 v,rhich an appeal \Vas taken .. The defendant 
c.ontendcd that. under the present Death Act (Aet Xo. 
297 Pub1ic .. l~.cts:. 1939) Olney having predeel\a~ed B~n­
nett, no rauf.;e of action for l1is death existed against a11Y 
person at the tinle of the death and that the same could 
not, the ref ore~ s ur"\'i ver The case revie·w·ed the connnon 
laVt' and prior enactments in the State of Miclrigan~ ID 
speaking of the changes the court said: 
"~'Jlhe Legislature has made not only the 
1vrongful act, neglect or default of the \Vrongdoer 
a nece~~a ry elernent in the ·eause of action~ but al~o 
the death of tbe in~ured par-ty i~ a neee~sary fact 
to the right of lri R representative to maintain all 
action under this an1endrnent.. Deatb is a pa ·rt of 
the ... ~·nD-·:d a nee or es.~·tnce of I- he right'' 
"·It ·i ne r it n l i 1 !I f o U u u, s t h a t the c <H t s e of actio 11 
for -inj-urh.·._ ... - t-e~-u/1 in._(/ ilt death created by this 
stat It te does ·not n risP or to ~n e i-n to &e. i nf) ·n nt il t b c 
death. Ot'(:n rs. The rnu~e of ar.-tion \\·hi(·h the in-
jured })fl rty bas fur l ~ i::; injuries no"\l' aha t4?-~ upo1l 
his de at ht at \vhi ch t i rne tlte ll e\\- ea usP of aet ion 
in hi~ pP r~onal representative c. tea ted by tlle ~tat­
nte aTiRe~. The l.Jegislature has ~iYru a Jlf'\r ri~ht 
of recovery in subst i1 uti on for the right v-.~hich the 
injun ~ct pa l't .\- had during hi~ 1 if etiine, tlu~ ha~ i ~ 
of ·w·hich is the satne \\~rongful art, but 'vhieh doc~ 
nnt e-on1e into being nnti 1 hi~ death.'' ( J tall e~ our~.) 
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Section 9657 provides: 
~"'\:hen death i~ caused by the wrongful act. ( ll' 
omission of any person or corporation, the per·-
sonal representative of the decedent n1ay Hlain-
tain an acti.on therefor if l1e nright have tnainta.in-
ed an action, had he lived, or an ]njury caused b~ 
the same act or omission. *~* The damages theTl'-
in ~ Ei* shall be for the exclusive benefit of the sur-
viving spouse and next of kin.~' 
Section 9656 reads as folio \rs : 
''A eause of action arising out of an injury to 
the pe r8o n, die~ v..,.i tlt the person of either party 
except as provided in Section 9657.!t~ 
Seetion 9G5G "\Vas u.rnended in 1.941 to read a.s follo,vs: 
~~A cause of a.cti on arising out of an injury 
to the person dies Vrith the person of the part: 
in \\··hose favor it exi~ts, except as provided in 
SPrt.ion 9657. It al~o diP~ ,,·ith the person against 
vlhom it exists~ except a cause of action arising 
out of bodily- injuries or death caused by the neg"li-
genee of a decedent ~nrvlve~ again~t J1i~ pe-r8onal 
representative.,._ 
'l'hP :\ l innesota r.ourt .i11 [n tei"pret inf!: t he~P ~t a tn tP~ 
said: 
"'TTnder the death hy "\Yl'Ongful utt ~tfitll~ (\ if 
tl1c \\'J"Onged person 1night have Inajntained an 
action had he lived, t1u:~ personal representatiYP~ 
of tl1e deceased \\·rouged person ntay Ina intain 
such ar.t ion.'~ 
It l1eld that the an1Pnded ~ta tntfl r·learly prn\~i(](•t.l that 
an .U(·tion could be hrought against tl1r adn1ini~trato1·. 
The statutes, l~n\vever~ invoiYc·d in that ra~f' \\~ere not the 
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~alnP a~ tho8e in thi~ state, and the decision, therefore, 
[~ inapplicable. 
(~oun6el al~o refers to the ...:\lahatua case of Shirley 
v. Shirl t'lf, 73 So. ( 2d) 77. ll is o'vn description of that 
~·n~e r.learly ~ho,,rs it i~ not in poi ut. rPhe appellant places 
~r<.~nt en•pha.H]~ and lUai·ks in j talie-'5 that t.hc 11laintiff's 
(leeea~ed died before the defendant'~ deceased. If the 
plaintiff\; de(leased had died before the detL~dent in this 
a{!tion~ "-e "W~ould have no proble1n. ''r e readily ~on cede 
that if the plaintiff's decedent dies first, then all of the 
•.·leinents of a ''-'Tongful death action are present. That 
(·a~P .. ho,vever, is no authority for the propoRition "\Vhere 
the plajntiff'~ decedent, as here, dies after the death of 
the aliep:~d \\"rongdoer. rro ~h<1\V that ihis \\'aH Cl-early 
t.hc ~i tua ti on pre~e n ted in that ra~e, \V(_~ quote b r i e±ly frorn 
the ("1ourt 's opinion; 
~~This is a ~uit hy' a n1othel' for the ,,~anton 
death of her rninor child raused hy another nilnor 
w·ho died in the san1P ar..ciden t t.,\. o or three hours 
a.JI er the death of plaintiff's inte~tat.c.'' 
r,urther1llt)l'f\ the C:(lUft in tl~at ea~P in speakin_g 0 l ~he 
_lf a r t in ('IIi. ~ ~ ~ 1-t ~ u· k e t a~ e said : 
~~ 1 t is at least qn~~t ionable \vhether the deci-
sion i~ ~trictly in point in vie"\v of the tertns of the 
statnte involved, *~'1!,., 
The (~a~P~ cited and rel1t\d upon by plajnti 1T are not 
in pnint. .l)ifferent statutes 'vere involved~ The deelsions 
\Vere based upon the particular ~ t a tutes .. 
A.s pr{_\\' i ousl.\· indicated, the eases 1 n t hi~ E1 :1. t eg-o ry 
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arc in conflict. \"'.l e 'vill now consider those supporting 
the opposjte viP\'t. 
~,he ease of :lfarl-tnelli -c. B-urke, { I\lass .. ) 10 N.E. (2d) 
113, involved fo11r 'vrongful death action~ brought to re-
cover damages for the death of the Vt•ife and three 1uinor 
children "\Vho \Vhile riding in an ant omo bile operat~~d by 
t lLe defcndan t 's inte~ta te v,,..ere killed at a railroad cross-
ing due to t}J e negligcnee of the defend.ant\ intestate. Of 
the five v1ctirn s of tl1 c accident the defendant'~ inte8ta te 
died first.. rrhc question 1V=.l~ \rhether tllC l'eHpeetiVt) 
p1aintiffs a:.:. affinlni~irators of the estatP.s of the ,~~jfe and 
the minor children had a right to recover damages. 
~{as~achusetts ;:;tatute provided in substance: .. ~.L-\. person 
\\~ho by his negligence or by his Vt'ilfult 'van ton or n:ek-
lest; acts ~*~ causes the death of a person **~ shall be 
liable~'' The Massac.husetts c.ourt also stated: 
'i l t has been stated repeatedly that uo cau8( 
o_f a el-i on a·ri.'}es 1.1.n.t·i.f the actual occurre1lce. of t J~ (' 
death for v~·hich recorPry -i._,' sought .. ·~~ Vlhen that 
event took place in eneh of the ea~es at bar the 
'per6on' \vho, in the Janguag~ of t.hP statut~, \vould 
~be liable~ ,,~a~ himself dead .. 'It i~ axio1natic that 
a corp~e i ~ not a per~on~' ~-.~ A dead per.'lo·n cUJI~ 
·not 'be liflf)lt,' nor ('f1n a con.\e o_( nttio~l ar-ise 
aqu; n ~t a ptr ~o u 1r ho does -n.o t eYi, .. 'f. ** :J. Thel'f 
are no ,,-ord~ in t1~e ~tutute "\\~hich can be con~trued 
as creating a new· r-a u~c of tl(·tj on nga in ~t the ad-
u 1 in i ~ t rator of the 'vrongdoer after hi~ appoint-
tnent. The ~H·.1 or hirn:3elf and not hi~ administrator 
i~ na1ned as the 'person~ 'vho is to "be liable.' 1,hf 
udu1in ist rat'or of tlu_\ }Jer~on killed i~ in a different 
position .. The .-.;tatntP 1~ r·x plieit in grant i.ng t n hhn 
the right to proseeute- in heha1f of thE=< ~prrified 
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beu(~rlein.rie~ the cause of nttion 'vhich arose upon 
t !K~ death of hi~ int\.\~tatc. In reference to this 
sa1ne st.at ut.e it "·a~ ~aid in Prodeeka v~ Turners 
Falls Power & r~~lectric Co., 238 .J-1 ass. 239, :248, 
130 N" .E. 386, 388, •*• .. 
"The coneluRion ]~ ineseapal)le that none of 
the actions can be maintained. That result hns 
been reached in the onlv case~ \\··hich \Ve have ~een 
dealing \vith the prec-is~ (tuestion and i~ ~upportcd 
hy the reasoning in c.ognat.c ~~asPs. Beaver~' ..-:\dn1'x 
v. .Putnam's Curator, 11 0 \~a. 71;1, G7 :-s+E.. 35:3 ; 
1 I I ( I •) 1 !:_) \\~ • ' ' ."J ~ ') r 9 ""\. T ""t"IT 66 o) o ) "'1 ege v.. rrorge ~ c~ · · 1 S~ t)-', -~' .._"r,,. -..·"·. .:..·~ ...... b 
'S ."\V. 1-l; lV·i liar(/ v. ~11 o 11 u ~ :1-1- ~.D .. 390, 130 N ~ \ V .. 
!f7D j Clark v~ Good,vin, 170 Cal. 527 ~ 150 P4 357, 
L.R+ ... ~4 1.916 .A~~ 11 +2; £Ta1nilton v. ~Tones, 125 Jnd4 
176~ ~~) X .ll~+ 1 D~ ; BateR 'T· Sy lve~t er ~ 295 ), f 04 4U3, 
·10+ S. \V. 73, 11 L.R.A. (X.S.) 1157, 120 Atn. St 
HPp. 761, .1:2 .A.nn. (~as. -1-G7; ~loe v. Srniley, 1~~) ·Pa .. 
1 :~6, 17 .. :"\. 228, 3 L .. R.A. 341; (~arT1gan v·. Cole, 
:~~-> R-.I~ ltL~, ~~1 ... :\.. 934; tT ohnt:1on v .. .f:!,arJncr, 89 rl\-·x~ 
()10, ;15 R .. \'T. 1062 .. ', (I talies ou r·s) 
~~~e al~o J.Sil-ra r .. K erynH, ( ~r as~~) ~:~ ~ .1"~~~ (2d) 8674 
'l,h i~ \\·a~ an action for both death and (•onsr·[ous suffering 
or tlll\ plaintiff\; intestate Silva alleged to have been 
(·au~ecl by tlte negligence of the defendant's inteRta1.e 
Keegan. Silva \Yas a guest pas~enger in the veh lclc oper-
ated hy KePgan. Both Silva and K r<..\~an died as a result 
of the accident. The trial juugc directed a verdi(~~- in favor 
of the defendant on the pTound thai. there '\"f.l~ no evidence 
that KePgan \\·a~ Rtill alive at the 1noment of the injury. 
It was eon c.ed ed that I( ecgan died at the scene of tl1e acci-
drnt and that. Silva dierl ~everal hours a.fter\\iards. The 
(·ou1·t he1d that. the ~T e\V ·York l.a.\V applied+ The ~ e'"' York 
statute a~ indieated hy the ~In~saehn8ct.t~ eourt: 
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'~*;t* creates the right of action b)' an executor 
or adrninistrator for ·wTongful a(-t~ ncgleet or de-
fault can sing death 'against a natural per!-;on \\~ho~ 
or a corp oration v-.'hich, V{ould have been liab 1 e to 
an action in fa vo t• of the decedent b~- rt\a ~on there-
of if death had not ensued.J In thiH case it is not 
shown that Keegan 'vlould have been liable to an 
actjon in favor of .:Silva if Silva had not died, he-
cause it h~ not sho"',.n that Keegan \\·a~ a living 
person against "~hom a cause of action could ari~(· 
\\-~hen Silva 'vas injured. 1U ore over Keegan v..""a~ 
dead and therefore 1\yas not ,;a natura} person' 
when Silva died. Ser.tion 118 provides for tltf' 
sur·vival of a(.{ions and causes of action after thP 
death of .:the pcr~on liable for the injur)~,' while 
section 119 provides for thP .survival of actjon~ 
and cause~ of action after the death of the 'person 
in \\'hose !"avor the ca usc of actj on c ~ i ~ted~' Neither 
~Pr.i ion 11~ nor ~ection 1.19 seeinH to u~ intended 
to create a ne\"~t cause of action after the death 
either of th_e \Vrongdoer or of tl1e per~on ,,-ronged. 
I~oth ser.ti on~ a.I)S1.l nJ r thn.t a can·" e o.f a tf iu u ha.\ 
arise-n again-st a. 'person. lial)le' touter sonlc ofh{~ 
latD or statu-te and rn.erely pro ride for t 1~ e con ti·u1r-
anc.e of tlw.l (a Jf.~e of action after dPallt~ ~Phe "'dP-
ceased person' against '\'ho~e executor or adnlini~ 
~t rat or an H<'t jon 111 a1y be brought or continued 
under s~et.iou 11S is the 'person liable,' ,,-ho~e 
death is referred to in the precedin~ ~entence. 
I/ <JJ.O c~nr~·(~ of action has nrisen. a-gai~}s/ a. liring 
'pe-r8o-n. lin{; I e' /.htre 1~s ·nothing ~upon u·h i cl1 (_l-ither 
of t hr..~· e sec I ·ion . .:. ea.-u opera I P ~ ~' ( It ali e ~ ours ) 
~~·c al.~o Clau, .... ·,-.·cn r. /Jrotlu-r.··."~ (N.C.), 145 S.E. 539~ 
wherein tlt(_l eourt ~aid: 
, .. _,As ha~ h0(Ln pointed out, it has be.Pn con-
~i.stently held in this state, in line 'vith the greatpr 
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\vei~ht of authority, that the rjght of action for 
dpa.th by \vrongful act under the death statute 
n(jt U(~eruing until the death of the person injured~ 
i~ a nt~\v right of action, and not a continuation 
of an old one, and \Ye eannot see, nor can it be 
~ue<:e~H ~\dly ~ho\vn, l1o"\v a cause of action can be 
held I o survive a certain event, \vhc.n it is not 
h rought. into (_ .. xi~tenee until and except hy the hap-
pening" or that event." 
~ ... ~e a~~o to t}le sa1ne effect .Bearcr~....; . ..tdn~'x ~}, P-ut-
Junn ·.-..· {~ 11rator ( '7" a.), o7 S .. E. :t);), and I l ettcl c .. Geo 1'gf'-
(\\'is.), RnprrL 
l ~()N( ~J.J t~~l\ lK 
involving statnt~r.; different fron1 the lJtah 
:--;tatute are in ~rPat conflict. The decjsions in those r:asP.~ 
are based upon the particular ~ t.a t.u te:::; i nvoJved~ }) i fferen t 
and var~~ i ng ronclu.sions have been reached. Ho\vcvcr, 
in the only t\YO rle~~ided CH~es \\ .. here the language: ~'shall 
not abate'~ lf.; eontaincd .in the ~tatutc6~ the garne being 
~denti("al \Vl t h that in the (~tah l~ode, the eourts have held 
that the 'r1·ongful death aetjon eannot be rnaintained 
against the l·~tate of the \\·' rongdo{_ .. r \vhere the v~.crong­
tloer ,~ death p •.• ~('l""( led t.ha t 0 r l he p laintj ff~s inte::; tate. 
\rllt--n the (~tab J~egi:-;Jatu t'l~ ("On~ide red this proble1n, 
.it uu~o-t have giv<._ .. n ~on1e thon~ht to the \vording n~ed and 
had before it the ~tat utcs of the other state~ \vhieh had 
been enacted upon this particular subject. Th(lSP 6tatutes 
had been r..onstrucd~ The l:tah Legislature adopt.cd the 
lan_guagp: .. ~hall not abate".. rrhi~ language had heeu 
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used in two otl1er states v..Those decisions had been con~ 
strued by appellate eourts1 and the decisions in e a ell in-
stance are in support o£ respondent's position. Our o'vn 
Supreme Court in the Fretz case has E;;tated that the lan-
guage: '"'shall not abate," requires the cause of action to 
be in existence prior to the tort feasor's death. The cau~(· 
of action in this case eould not possibly have been in 
existence until the plaintiff's decedent died, which wa~ 
seven days after the alleged tort feasor had hlmself died. 
It is~ therefore, re!-3pectfully subnritted that the decision 
of the ]ower court should be affirmed .. 
R·espectfully submitted,. 
Attor-ney for /) P _f P·n.rln ~ ~ t a.-11 ( l 
Respondent 
604-610 Boston Bu i I ding 
Salt Lake City~ Utah 
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